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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeal has jurisdiction in this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Should this Court overturn a jury verdict when the

evidence presented by Uintah County supports the verdict, the
Appellants put on no evidence to rebut the testimony presented
by Uintah

County

and

the Appellants

fail

to marshal

the

evidence in support of the verdict?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellants must marshal all the evidence supporting
the jury verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient

when viewed

in support

of the

jury verdict.

Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968 130 (Utah
2002).
2.
language

Should the Court, change the case law and ignore the
of

the

statute,

by

requiring

owner

consent

in

determining if a road has been dedicated to the public?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue is a question of law which the court reviews
for correctness. Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 48 P.3d 218, 18 (Utah
2002).

1

3.

Does a party preserve the right to challenge a jury

instruction when a party consents to the instruction prior to
it being read to the jury and the instruction is accurate and
supported by the testimony?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This

is

correctness.

an

issue

of

law

which

is

reviewed

for

Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 48 P.3d 218, 58 (Utah

2002).
4.
exhibits

Is the trial court required to receive documents as
when

there

is

no

foundation

presented

for

the

document, and the documents are not relevant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rulings on admissibility of evidence present issues of
law, which are reviewed for correctness.
Inc., 48 P.3d 218, IS
5.

Bishop v. Gentec,

(Utah 2002).

Did the trial court err by refusing

Appellant's

request to place size restrictions on vehicles using a public
road after the case was concluded and when the

requested

restrictions were not plead, were not part of the
presented

to the jury and no evidence

on that

issues

issue was

presented at trial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue is a question of law which the court reviews
for correctness. Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 48 P.3d 218, 18 (Utah
2002)
2

6.

Should Appellants be ordered to reimburse Uintah

County for the attorney' s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure?
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104(1):
A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 29, 1999, Plaintiffs, Chapmans and Harmston
(herein referred to as "Chapmans") filed a Complaint asking
the

Court

to

determine

that

a

road

which

Plaintiffs' property was not a public road.

crosses

the

Uintah County

filed its Answer and Counterclaim alleging that the road had
been dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §72-5104.

A jury trial was held September 4 and 5, 2001.

The jury

found that the road was a public road finding that it had been
used by the public from 1960 through 1998. (Addendum 5 & 7)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The road in question is referred to as the North

Wyaskett Bottom Road. T. 10 (referred to herein as Road)

The

Road travels along the East side of the Green River from a
point where State Road 88 crosses the Green River at Ouray and
then the Road connects with other roads that either go to
Vernal or the oil field South of Vernal.

3

The Road traverses

mainly

public

Plaintiffs.
2.

lands

and

also

crosses

property

by

Exhibit 1.

The Chapmans' predecessors, in 1956, homesteaded

part of the land through which the Road travels.
the

owned

Chapmans'

property

was

homesteaded

the

At the time

Road

already

existed. T. 292
3.

At trial, Uintah County called several witnesses to

testify regarding the use of the Road by the public.

Chapmans

did not call any witnesses or rebut any of the testimony.
4.

Gilbert Brough testified that in 1929 he was born

in the area where the Road was located, and that he often
traveled the Road throughout his lifetime of over 70 years.
He recalled using the Road in the 1930's and 1940 f s, even
before the Chapmans' property was homesteaded (T: 39-40).

He

remembered taking his pickup along the Road to Johnson Bottoms
to fish in the 1940's and during that time period saw a lot of
others also using the Road (T: 41-43).
5.

Mr. Brough worked for an oilfield service company,

Schlumberger, beginning in 1954.

He testified that he often

used the Road to return to Vernal from the oilfield because it
was a shorter route and he considered it to be a public road
(T: 46-47).

He used the Road as often as 5 or 6 times per

month (T: 47). When he traveled the Road during the 1950's,
he

saw

lots of oilfield

traffic

4

on the Road

as well as

hunters.

Mr. Brough was then transferred to Colorado for a

time period and in 1966 he returned to Vernal.

Upon his

return to Vernal he continued to use the Road for travel to
his assignments

in the oilfield.

He testified that the Road

had been improved since he used it in the 1950!s and that he
continued to use the Road from 1966 through 1987 for travel to
and from the oilfield in his employment with Schlumberger.
(T:52) Mr. Brough further testified that since his retirement
he used the Road for recreational purposes in the 1990fs and
that during that time period he has seen BLM vehicles and
others using the Road (T54-55).
6.

Gene Nyberg, former Road Superintendent for Uintah

County, testified that he had graded the south portion of the
Wyaskett Bottom Road during the time periods of 1952 to 1959
and 1965 to 1972.

(T:74).

He testified that when he was

grading he would see members of the public using the Road,
mainly oilfield related traffic.

He also testified that he

traveled the Road to get to the Red Wash oil field.

Mr.

Nyberg stated that it was a dirt-graded Road, that he did not
recall ever seeing any gates on the Road and never sought
permission to use the Road (T:78,86).
7.

Daniel Alonso, the manager of the Ouray Wildlife

Refuge which is mainly located across the Green River from the
Road, testified that the Refuge was established in May of 1960

5

(T:92) and that it is adjacent to the Road.

He testified that

since his involvement as the manager he has seen a lot of
traffic on the Road including, oilfield traffic, hunters,
fishers,

and

government

workers, bird

photographers and others.

(T:94,98).

watchers,

wildlife

He further testified

that the refuge has maintained the Road for approximately 17
years (T:100,101).
a gate Chapmans

The only gate that he is familiar with is

installed that started this lawsuit.

He

further testified that the Road had been graded and graveled
and that cattle guards and culverts had been put in the Road
(T:102,103).
8.

Val Smuin testified that he had used the Road for

over 35 years, that beginning in the 1960's he had used the
Road

to

access

the

Green

River

for

trapping

with

grandfather (T:133) and that they used it often (T:135).

his
He

testified that it was a dirt road without any gates or fences
to obstruct its use.

He testified that in the 1970fs he used

the Road to hunt and fish as often as three times a week
during the winter (T:137).

While he was using the Road, he

also saw other hunters and oilfield workers traveling the
Road.

He also used the Road during the summers to fish, shoot

prairie dogs and take his kids on outings. (T:149) At no time
did he ever ask for permission to use the Road (T:153).
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9.

Chad Smuin testified that he has used the Road

since the early 1980s to the present.

His first memory of

traveling the Road was when he went fishing with his father
(T:179).

He

testified

that

beginning

in

the

1980fs

he

remembered using the Road every year, six to eight times per
month in the winter and three to four times per month in the
summer, for recreational purposes.

It was a well traveled

road and he saw other members of the public traveling the
Road.

He testified that he continues to use the Road, that it

is a reasonably well maintained Road and at no time did he
ever seek permission to use the Road (T:185,190).
10.

Herb Troester testified that he was the manager of

the Ouray Wildlife Refuge from July of 1976 to August of 1983
and that while he was there he was on the Road many times and
that he used the Road personally for hunting (T:209-211) . He
saw members of the public using the Road including fisherman
and hunters. T. 209.
enough

he

traveled

pheasants. T.210.
use the Road.

It was a graveled road and was good
it

in

his

Volkswagen

Rabbit

to

hunt

He never asked permission from anyone to

The only gate was one the Refuge installed to

keep cattle off the Refuge but that road did not hinder the
public's use of the Road. T. 211.
11.

Bret Prevedel testified that he had used the Road

starting in either 1990 or 1991 and he used it every year

7

since for access to hunt by the Refuge (T:215).

He testified

that it was an oilfield type road without vegetation on it and
that it was a good road when it was dry and muddy when wet
(T:217).

He further testified that he never saw any gates on

the Road, never sought permission to use the Road, and that he
always considered it a public road and that he had seen many
other members of the public using the Road (T:218,219).
12.

Clay Hacking testified that he had used the Road

for over 30 years beginning in the early 1970!s (T:241).

He

and friends had traveled there during the summer and fall for
hunting

(T:243) and saw others traveling the Road

(T:243).

The other people he saw using the Road included fish and
wildlife officers, oilfield workers, and hunters (T:244).

At

no time did he ever seek permission and there were no gates on
the Road (T:244).

The Road was graded and there were always

other members of the public using the Road.
13.

Gary Mecham testified that he was a heavy equipment

operator for the Refuge and that he had maintained the Road
since 1983

(T:253).

He testified that he was on the Road

weekly and did not ever recall being on the Road when there
were not members of the public using the Road.

Those members

of the public included hunters, cattlemen, oilfield workers,
stockman, fisherman, and bird watchers.

He had also used it

personally for sightseeing and hunting (T:256).
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There were no

gates on the Road.

There were some cattle guards.

He always

considered the road to be a public Road and never

sought

permission to use it. (T:256).
14.

One of the representatives of the Plaintiffs, Greg

Harmston, testified that when his father patented the property
in the 1950fs the Road already existed (T:269).
testified

that

neither

he

nor

the

He further

Fredricksons,

the

predecessor to Chapmans, ever objected to the public using the
Road (T:276).

He testified that oilfield companies and the

Refuge had maintained the Road (T:278,279).

Originally two

gates were put in for managing cattle but were taken out and
replaced with cattle guards, with the last gate being removed
in 1974 (T:284).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.
Mecham,

The testimony of Mr. Brough or the Smuins or Mr.
standing

alone,

support

the

jury's

verdict.

The

cumulative testimony of 12 witnesses overwhelmingly support
that

verdict.

Chapmans

ignore

that

testimony

when

they

challenge the verdict. Chapmans fail to marshal the evidence,
rather they pick and choose the testimony that supports their
version of the case.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) does not require owner

consent for a Road to be abandoned and dedicated to the

9

public.

The case law is consistent with that statute and

should not be overruled.
3.

Chapmans consented to jury instructions 7 and 33 and

therefore

did

not

preserve

instructions on appeal.

the

right

to

challenge

those

In addition, those instructions are

accurate statements of the law and consistent with the facts.
4.

Chapmans presented no foundation nor any information

showing that Exhibits 4 and 5 were relevant and therefore the
trial court properly refused to admit those exhibits.
5.

The trial court acted properly in denying Chapmans

belated request to restrict the use of the Road after the jury
had entered its verdict when those restrictions were not pled,
no evidence was submitted on the issue and the jury was not
instructed on those requested restrictions.
6.

This appeal is without merit and Uintah County should

be awarded the legal fees incurred.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE JURY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT TRIAL BY UINTAH COUNTY.
CHAPMANS
PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO THE JURY AND NOW FAIL TO
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THAT VERDICT.
The Road had been used to access lands along the Green
River prior to the Chapmans' property being homesteaded in the
1930!s and 1940 f s.

Plaintiff, Harmston testified that the

10

Road existed when his father homesteaded the property in 1956.
The public had unfettered use of the property until Plaintiff,
Chapman acquired the property in 1998 and attempted to block
the Road.

When Uintah County took the position that it was a

public road, Chapmans then filed this lawsuit asking the court
to rule that the Wyasket Bottom Road was not a public road.
That issue was tried to a jury on September 4 and 5,
2001. After receiving testimony from 12 witnesses the jury
returned a verdict finding that the Wyasket Bottom Road was a
public road and had been used by the public from 1960 through
1998 (1998 was when Plaintiff Chapman acquired the property
and blocked the Road resulting in this law suit) . (Addendum 5)
Chapman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury's verdict.
On

appeal,

evidence,
support

of

when

challenging

the

sufficiency

of

the

Chapman has the burden to marshal the evidence in
that

verdict

and

then

show

the

evidence

is

insufficient to support the verdict. Brookside Mobile Home
Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d

968 530

(Utah 2002).

When the

appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the Court will not
consider the challenge to the jury's verdict.

Smith v Smith

995 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1999), Lefavi v Bertich 994 P.2d
817, 821 (Utah App. 2000) and Koulis v Standard Oil Co. of
California 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987).
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Chapmans, in

their brief, did not marshal the evidence, but rather picked
and chose the facts that support Chapmans' theory.

The Court

should dismiss the challenge to the jury's verdict out of
hand.
Nevertheless, if the Court were to consider the issue of
sufficiency of the evidence, which was not properly briefed,
it is clear that the verdict is more than adequately supported
by the witnesses for the County.

Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104(1)

sets forth three elements that must be proven to show a road
has been abandon and dedicated to the public.
are;

1)

continuous

use

of

the

road,

Those elements

2)

as

throughfare, and 3) for a period of ten years.

a

public

Campbell v.

Box Elder County 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1998)and Heber City
Corp. v. Simpson 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997).
The
elements.

testimony

of

many

county

witnesses

met

those

The first witness, Gilbert Brough was born in that

area in 1929.

He used the Road as a teenager with his friends

in the 1940f s to fish and hunt.

Beginning in 1954 he used the

Road to reach oil field well locations as part of his work for
Schlumberger,

an

oil

field

service

company.

traveled the Road five to six times a month.

Mr.

Brough

While on the

Road he saw lots of other members of the public using the Road
including other oil field traffic and recreation users.

Mr.

Brough was transferred to another area for a few years and

12

then in 1966 transferred back to Vernal.

He continued to use

the Road to reach oil field locations from 1966 to 1987 when
he retired and even after retirement has used the Road for
sightseeing and recreation. Mr. Brough testified that when he
was traveling the Road he always saw other members of the
public on the Road.

Mr. Brough's testimony by itself fully

supports the jury verdict.
The other witnesses all agreed with and supported Mr.
Brough.

Gene Nyberg testified that he saw the public using

the Road from 1965 to 1972 when he worked in the area grading
the county roads. Three employees of the Ouray Wildlife Refuge
(Dan Alonso, Herb Troester and Gary Mecham) testified that the
Road had been used by the public to access parts of the Refuge
since the Refuge's

creation

in 1960. In addition,

Refuge

employees had maintained the Road, graveled, graded and put in
cattle guards. Mr. Mecham, a heavy equipment operator for the
Refuge since 1983, was on the Road on at least a monthly basis
and saw members of the public using the Road every time he
traveled or maintained the Road.

He saw oil field traffic,

stockman, hunters, fisherman, sightseers and bird watchers,
using the Road and had used it on a personal basis.

There

were never any signs or gates indicating the Road was not
public until Chapman put up a gate in 1998.
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Three hunters/fishermen (Val Smuin, Chad Smuin and Clay
Hacking) testified as to their and other's use of the Road.
Val Smuin had used the Road for over 35 years beginning in the
mid 1960 f s.

It was a dirt road that had been improved over

the years. He saw others using the Road and that use increased
as the years passed.

There were no gates or fences to block

the public's use of the Road.

Chad Smuin remembered using the

Road beginning in 1980 and he had used the Road every year for
6 to 8 times in the winter and 3 to 4 times in the summer.

He

testified that it was a descent, well traveled Road and he
always saw others using the Road. Clay Hacking had used the
Road since the early 1970? s for hunting.

While on the Road he

saw other hunters, wildlife officers and oil field traffic.
There were no gates or signs prohibiting the use of the Road
by the public.
Greg Harmston testified that the Road was there when his
father patented the property in 1956.

He testified that they

put gates on the Road in the 1950f s to control cattle but
removed

those

and

replaced

them with

cattle

guards.

He

testified that the Road was used by the public and when the
oil field activity started the Road was used on a regular
basis.

He also testified that the Road had been maintained by

the Refuge and oil companies.

14

Chapmans had the burden to marshal all the evidence and
then

show

the

facts would

not

support

the

jury verdict.

Chapman, at trial put on no evidence and on appeal they have
not marshaled the evidence but have pick certain portions of
testimony and placed those out of context to tell Chapmans'
version
supports

of

the

the

case.

The

testimony

of Mr.

Brough

verdict.

The

testimony

of

three

witnesses supports the verdict.

Harmston

Refuge

The testimony of Mr. Smuin

and Mr. Mecham support the verdict.
Plaintiff

the

alone

Even the testimony of

supports the verdict. When taken as a

whole, the testimony overwhelmingly supports the verdict.
POINT II
NEITHER THE STATUTE NOR CASE LAW REQUIRES OWNER
CONSENT FOR A ROAD TO BE DEDICATED AND ABANDONED TO
THE PUBLIC.
Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions Nos. 5, 6, and 71
are contrary to the language of the statute and case law.

The

i

Chapman approved Jury Instruction No. 7. At page 314
(Addendum 2) of the transcript the following exchange
occurred.
Mr. Beckwith: No. 7 had to do with the definition of
thoroughfare, coming from Morris versus Blunt. The Court
has accepted some of that language and rejected the rest,
and rewritten its own instruction relative to thoroughfare.
The Court: And you don't object to what we've done
there?
Mr. Beckwith: No.
15

statute and the case law are clear that neither consent nor
acquiescence by the landowner is required for a road to be
abandoned and

dedicated to the public.

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 provides:
"A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years/'
Case

law

has

established

that

three

elements

under

this

statute must be proven, (1) that the road has been used by the
public, (2) for ten consecutive years or more as (3) a public
thoroughfare. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997)
The Plaintiffs' proposed instructions numbers, 5, 6 and 7
sought to add a fourth element of requiring the consent of the
land

owner.

That

argument

has

been

occasions by the Utah Appellate Courts.

rejected

on

several

See Draper City v.

Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) p i t is not necessary
that the owner of the private road had the intent to offer the
road to the public"); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d
806 f.3 (Utah App. 1998)("more recent cases have definitively
stated that owner intent is now irrelevant to determining
whether a road has been dedicated and abandoned to public
use"); Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah
1997) ("We have subsequently abandoned interpreting into the
language of the statute the requirement that the owner must
consent to the dedication"); and Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow
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Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213

(Utah 1981) ("There is no need to

prove the landowner's intent".)
To adopt Chapmans's requested instructions would require
that the language of the statute be ignored and the overruling
of a number of cases on the issue, which span several decades.
The instructions given to the jury on this issue, instructions
23 thru 28 were accurate statements of the law (Addendum 4 ) .
POINT III
CHAPMANS APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 33 PRIOR TO
THE INSTRUCTION BEING GIVEN TO THE JURY AND FAILED
TO PRESERVE THAT INSTRUCTION ON APPEAL.
Chapman

next

objects

to

the

Instruction No. 33 regarding gates.

trial

court's

Jury

Chapman consented to

Instruction No. 33, it is accurate and there were no facts
presented

at trial

to

support

Chapmans' theory

regarding

gates.
The issue of the impact of a gate in the Road arose
during Chapmans' closing arguments. Even though there were no
facts to support the argument, Chapmans' counsel argued that
the ten year requirement could not be met because there were
gates blocking the public's use of the Road.
(Addendum 3).

T. 356-357

The trial court stopped the argument, excused

the jury and prepared

jury instruction no. 33 to address

counsel's argument with respect to that issue.
the following discussion took place:

17

At that time,

The Court: Listen to this.
"There has been
testimony concerning certain gates across the
Roadway at various times. Such gates may or may
not interrupt public use of the Roadway. Whether
the gates which were placed across the Roadway did
in fact interrupt use by the public is an issue for
the jury to decide."
Mr. Beckwith: I'll accept that.
The jury then returned and that instruction was given to
the jury.

Chapmans, rather than preserving the instruction

for appeal, approved the instruction.
agree

with

the

instruction

instruction on appeal,

and wanted

If Chapmans did not
to

challenge

Chapmans' burden was to object to the

instruction and explain the reason for the objection.
Civ. P. 51.

that

Utah R.

If Rule 51 is not followed, then the instruction

can not be challenged on appeal. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P. 3d
1119, f10 and 11 (Utah 2002).

In this case Chapman not only

did not object, he approved it.
The evidence at trial fully supports the instruction and
the jury's determination that any alleged gate did not prevent
the public from using the Road.

The only gate that attempted

to prevent the public using the Road was the one Chapman
installed in 1998 that led to this lawsuit.
was a public road.

By then the Road

Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 753

(Utah 1982) . Witnesses, Brough, Smuins, Previdel, Hacking and
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Mecham all testified that there were never any gates blocking
the public's use of the Road.2
POINT IV
CHAPMAN'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 9 MISSTATES THE
LAW AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS.
Chapman also complains that the Court did not give the
proposed jury instruction no. 9 regarding seasonal use of the
Road by hunters or fishermen with consent of the landlord.
The trial court did give jury instruction no. 25 (Addendum 4)
defining continuous use of the Road by the public.
the

facts nor the law support the Court giving

Neither
Chapman's

proposed instruction 9.
Chapmans cite three cases from other jurisdictions, then
claims that Utah has not addressed seasonal use for recreation
purposes.

That is not true.

Several cases in this state have

addressed that issue and held that seasonal use is sufficient
to create public use of the Road.

Campbell v. Box Elder

County, 962 P.2d 806 (Utah App. 1998); and Bover v. Clark, 326

Only two witnesses testified to gates on the Road prior to
1998. Herb Troester testified that the Refuge put in a gate
along the Road to keep cattle off the Refuge and Plaintiff
Harmston testified that gates were put in during the 1950fs
but those gates were removed by 1971 and replaced by cattle
guards which control livestock but allow passage of the
public. T. 282-284. The jury considered this evidence in
its deliberations based on the Court's instructions, and
determined that they did not change the use of the Road as a
public way.
19

P.2d 107 (Utah 1958).
Chapman's argument.

Furthermore the facts do not support

The facts showed that the Road was used

every month of the year by numerous members of the public
including oil field workers, government employees, hunters,
sightseers, bird watchers and fisherman.
The instruction given by the Court on continuous use of
the Road was based on the law of this state and the verdict
entered by the jury is supported by the facts on this issue.
POINT V
CHAPMANS
PROVIDED
NO
FOUNDATION
FOR
INTRODUCTION OF PROPOSED EXHIBITS 4 AND 5.

THE

Chapmans, at the conclusion of Uintah County's evidence,
informed

the

witnesses.

court

that

they

would

not

be

calling

any

Chapmans' counsel then presented to the court two

documents granting pipeline easements which documents were
marked as Exhibits 4 and 5 and asked the court to receive
those documents as evidence.
witness

to

identify

the

T. 295-296

documents,

Chapman called no

to

testify

to

their

authenticity or to identify how the documents had relevance to
the issue before the jury.
counsel,

The court received argument from

pointed out to Chapman's counsel that he had the

burden to lay a foundation for the documents and the burden to
show the documents were relevant.

T.303

The trial court then

refused to receive the documents as exhibits pointing out that
there

was

no

testimony

regarding
20

the

documents,

nor

any

evidence showing that any user of the Road was using the Road
in connection with the pipeline easement and therefore no
showing of relevancy.

T. 306.

It is a basic rule of evidence that for a document to be
introduced there must be foundation provided and a showing
that the document is relevant.
901.

Chapmans

did

nothing

Utah R. Evid. 401, 402 and

to meet

their

burden

for

the

exhibits to be admitted. The court ruled correctly in not
allowing the admission of those exhibits.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED CHAPMANS' REQUEST
TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF THE ROAD AFTER
THE JURY RENDERED ITS VERDICT BECAUSE THE REQUESTED
RESTRICTIONS WERE NOT PLED NOR PRESENTED TO THE
JURY.
Chapmans'

Amended

Complaint

restriction on the use of the Road.

did

not

request

any

The parties, prior to the

trial, stipulated to the width and location of the Road. R.
116. Chapmans did not request any instructions to the jury,
and

the

jury was not requested

to decide, if there were

restrictions on the use of the Road (Addendum 1) . Several days
after the jury had entered its verdict, Chapman requested the
court to restrict the size of vehicles that could use the
Road. R. 1128. The court denied that motion as being untimely
and not pled. R. 1139 (Addendum 6).
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Generally, the width and use of the Road is determined to
be that which is reasonably needed by the public.
Bertaanole,
Martin,

916

116
P.2d

P.2d

420, 423

910,

914

(Utah

1941) and

(Utah App.

1996).

Jeremy v.
Kohler v.
Chapmans'

arguments and cases based on prescriptive easement have no
application to this case.

In this case the parties stipulated

to the Road's width and location prior to trial. R. 116.
Neither

party

requested

restrictions on the Road.

that

the

jury

decide

any

other

R. 930. Therefore, no evidence was

presented on that issue, the jury was not instructed on that
issue and the jury did not enter a verdict on that issue. It
would

have been clear error

for the trial court to have

imposed the restrictions requested by Chapmans when that issue
had never been pled nor presented to the jury.
Additionally, once the jury determined that the Road was
a public way, the restrictions on the size of the vehicles to
use the public way would be governed by state statute.

As

long as the vehicle was within the legal size and weight
restrictions for the public way, it could be operated on the
Road.
POINT VII
UINTAH COUNTY SHOULD BE REIMBURSED FOR THE LEGAL
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL.
Chapman's appeal is without merit in several respects
including:
22

1)

Chapmans refused to marshal the evidence in support

of the jury verdict but rather picked and chose those facts
that fit their theory of the case.
2)

Chapmans' request that the Court add owner consent

as an element to prove a public road is clearly contrary to
the language of the statute and case law, and is not based on
a good faith extension of the law.
3)

Chapmans challenge two jury instructions

(7 & 3 3 ) ,

which were approved by Chapmans, is clearly without merit.
4)

Chapmans' objection to the trial court's refusal to

allow documents
about,

for which no witness was called to

or provide

foundation

for, is contrary

to

testify
the

most

basic requirements of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
5)

Chapman's request, after the jury verdict was

rendered, to add restrictions to the use of the Road and then
challenge

the court's denial of that request, has no

legal

precedent.
Rule 33 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure allow this
Court

to

believes

award
that

fees
the

for merit

issues

less

raised

in

appeals. Uintah
the

appeal

County

against

it

qualifies as merit less. When the facts surrounding what was
appealed, the state of the procedural posture of the issues
appealed

and

considered,

the

there

status
is

no

of

the

law

reasonable

23

on

basis

those
to

issues

believe

is
that

success on appeal was even probable.

Uintah County requests

the Court to award it fees in this case.
CONCLUSION
Uintah County requests the Court to affirm the jury
verdict, dismiss the appeal and award Uintah County the legal
fees incurred on appeal.
Dated this

("^ day of September, 2002.
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED,
McCLELtf% & TROTTER, P.C.
Attorcfe^s for
Defendant /Appellee
By:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
Clark B Allred, attorney for Defendant/Appellee certifies
that he served the attached BRIEF OF APPELLEE upon counsel by
placing two true and correct copies thereon in an envelop
addressed to:
Mr. Daniel S. Sam
Attorney at Law
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84078
and deposited

the

James A. Beckwith
Attorney at Law
7910 Ralston Rd., Suite 7
Arvada, CO 80002

same, sealed, with

first

class postage

prepaid thereon, in the United States Mail at Vernal, Utah, on
the

jib day of September, 2002.

Clark B Allred
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ADDENDUM
1)

Stipulation in Limine

2)

Transcript page 314

3)

Transcript pages 356 - 357

4)

Jury Instruction 23 thru 28

5)

Jury Verdict

6)

Ruling dated 09/28/01

7)

Order and Judgment dated September 25, 2001
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0055
DONNA M. TROTTER - 8084
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (435) 789-4908
MARK THOMAS
deputy Uintah County Attorney
152 E 100 N
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (435) 781-4356
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MILE CHAPMAN,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

STIPULATION IN LIMINE

)

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.
COMES

NOW,

the

parties

to

Judge A. Lynn Payne
Civil No. 990800255 PR

the

above-entitled

matter

and

herewith enter into the following Stipulations In Limine governing
the admissibility of evidence and/or legal argument in the trial of
the within matter:
1.

The parties stipulate that the issue for jury

determination

in

this

proceeding

is

whether

the

road

across

Plaintiffs' properties in Sec 33, T7S, R21E and Sees. 4 and 5, T8S,
R21E, SLM

(Hereafter, "North Wyasket Bottom Road') has become a

public highway pursuant to 72-5-104, U.C.A.
2.

The parties therefore stipulate and agree that evidence,

both testimonial and documentary, regarding the classification of
North Wyasket Bottom Road by Uintah County as a Utah Class B, Utah
Class D and/or an RS 2477 Right-of-Way is not relevant to the issue
and therefore shall be inadmissible under all circumstances of the
trial.

The parties shall so instruct their witnessed and counsel

to avoid any breach of this stipulation.
Signed and Submitted this /I

day of

\\,\UL.-LJ

, 2001.

McKEACHNIEv-ALLRED,
McCLELLAN A TROTTER, P.C,
Attorneys/fot Defendants

J

/

« /

f

^
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1 .-I.-

Daniel S. Sam

James A. Beckwith

/
/

'./

-314-

1

the Supreme Court.

2
3

MR. BECKWITH: Implicitly you had already ruled upon
it.

I merely needed to make an appropriate record.

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

MR. BECKWITH: No. 7 had to do with the definition of

6

thoroughfare, coming from Morris versus Blunt.

7

accepted some of that language and rejected the rest, and

8

rewritten its own instruction relative to thoroughfare.

9
10

The Court has

THE COURT: And you don't object to what we've done
there?

11

MR. BECKWITH: No.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MR. BECKWITH: I've already preserved the objection

14

relative to use under private right.

15

use of the road by the public.

16

ins truction, although merged it into its other instruction

17

about abandonment and dedication.

Instruction No. 8 is the

The Court has accepted this

18

THE COURT: All right.

19

MR. BECKWITH: Yes.

20

THE COURT: Since I've given that?

21

MR. BECKWITH: Yes.

22

THE COURT: You're satisfied with that.

23

MR. BECKWITH: And then instruction No. 9 was the

So are you all right with that?

24

seasonal use.

25

our exception to the Court's ruling.

The Court has rejected that.

We note and record

-3561

homes or anything else out in this area except the old Louie

2

Hall ranch and the Dutch Searles' ranch, which is no longer

3

out there.

4

establishments such as stores, businesses, shopping malls

5

that people need to get to.

6

Nobody lives out here.

There are no commercial

There are no oil and gas well activities that any oil

7

service company has serviced in hauling in heavy equipment by

8

semis or other larger rigs.

9

testimony, has been pick-up only, not the big rigs, because

Everything, if you believe the

10

everybody has acknowledged there is a dugway north of the

11

Fredrickson property, steep grade —

12

it at 8 percent.

13

then you drop down.

14

Mr. Harmston has estimated

That's a pretty steep grade -- twisting, and

After 1974 the northern gate is removed.

Then in

15

comes Mr. Troester, and Mr. Troester becomes the manager of

16

the refuge, and during his management until 1983 the refuge has

17

installed a gate in Bull Durham Flats.

18

gate to get in, or to get through.

19

There has been no testimony that that gate was ever removed, or

20

if it was, when it was removed.

21

reassigned elsewhere and goes on other duties.

22

You have to open that

That gate is across there.

Mr. Troester then leaves, gets

After 1983 the evidence further shows that in 1998

23

a gate was put across the road by Mr. Chapman.

We know that

24

that gate was locked because Mr. Chapman offered and gave to

25

Mr. Aionso, which Mr. Alonso has admitted, gave him a key
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so that the refuge could come through.

2

described each of those gates and encountering those gates.

3

Those gates interrupt continuity of use, and they interrupt

4

ten years.

5

Other witnesses have

MR. ALLRED: I'm going to object.

That's not the law

6

and the Court ought to instruct that there's nothing indicating

7

that a gate there interrupts the use.

8

that it ever interrupted anybody's use and the law certainly

9

(inaudible).

10
11

There's no facts showing

MR. BECKWITH: Is Counsel arguing to the Court that the
gate has to be locked?

12

MR. ALLRED: There's no evidence indicating that

13

THE COURT: Well, there's no jury instruction on that

14

—

particular part.

15

MR. BECKWITH: Because there is no such law in Utah.

16

THE COURT: Well, you surprised me.

17

jury for a minute.

18

argument?

Let me excuse the

Are you fairly close to your closing

19

MR. BECKWITH: Just about.

20

THE COURT: I'm concerned about the issue, but I don't

21
22
23
24
25

want to interrupt your flow too much.
MR. BECKWITH: And I would appreciate it.

I didn't

interrupt Mr. Allred's.
THE COURT: Well, why don't you continue and then we
may very well come back to that issue.

INSTRUCTION NO.:-

;

3

A road is a public road if the evidence established by clear and convincing evidence
each of the following:
1. Continuous use by the public
2. As a public thoroughfare
3. For a period of ten consecutive years
If you find from the evidence that each of the foregoing elements has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence, you should return a verdict that the road is a public road. If ,
on the other hand, you find that the evidence does not establish one or more of the above
elements by clear and convincing evidence you should return a verdict that the road is not a
public road.

INSTRUCTION NO.:
The term road includes any street, alley, lane, court or place.

INSTRUCTION NO.:

^

Continuous use does not require that the public use the road constantly or that a large
number of the public use the road. Even infrequent use is sufficient to prove a road was
continuously used as a public thoroughfare. Continuous use is proven by clear and convincing
evidence that members of the public have been able to use the road as often as they found it
necessary or convenient. The use does not have to be for a particular purpose and can be for
agriculture, recreational, business or any other purpose.

INSTRUCTION NO.:

XL

A thoroughfare is a place or way through which there is a passing or travel. It becomes
a public thoroughfare when the public has a general right of passage. Even though property
over which the road passes is privately owned, a road will be deemed dedicated or abandoned
to public use when the public has continuously used a thoroughfare for a period of 10 years.
Nevertheless, the use must be by the public at large. Use by adjoining land owners or
their employees (in connection with their employment) is not considered to be use by the
public.

INSTRUCTION NO.:

•'' f

Once it has been established that a road has been continuously used by the public as a
public thoroughfare for more than 10 years, the road is a public road and will continue to be a
public road until the road is abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authority having
jurisdiction over the roadway, or by other competent authority.

INSTRUCTION NO.:

;.?

A road which is established through continuous use is established through its use by the
public over 10 years as a public thoroughfare. Under such circumstances, the land owner is
deemed to have dedicated or abandoned the roadway for the use of the public as a public
road.

The landlord is not entitled to compensation for the roadway nor is the County under

any obligation to pay the owner for the use of the land

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NILE CHAPMAN, Et.AL,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

UINTAH COUNTY,

Case No.:

990800255

Defendant.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions:
1. Do you find that the road at issue in this proceeding is a public road?
ANSWER:

Yes

X

No

2. If your answer to Question No.l is "Yes", then specify the consecutive years in
which the road in issue in this proceeding was used by the public.

ANSWER:

DATED this

H (g 0 ^

{ ^ l

day of September, 2001.

\c

£

Foreperson

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NILE CHAPMAN, ROGER CHAPMAN,
and GORDON HARMSTON, TRUSTEE
OF THE EUGENE HARMSTON
TRUST,

riLhO

RULING

UloirilCTCOUft
'JINTAH COUNTY U

SEP 2 ; 200
JOA^NEY/lcjAbE CL!

_M.:__;

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No.: 990800255

UINTAH COUNTY,
Defendant.

The Court has reviewed the proposed orders which have been submitted by the parties.
The issue at trial was whether the road was a public road. The jury was not asked to decide
and did not decide whether there was any limit on the type of vehicle which could use the
road. Therefore, the Court has signed the Order submitted by Defendants.
DATED this

i ? day of September, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PA

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTD7ICATE
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ yfo*,day of September, 2001, true and correct copies of
the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. James A. Beckwith,
Attorney at Law, at 7910 Ralston Road, Suite 7, Arvada, CO 80002, Mr. Daniel S. Sam,
Attorney at Law, at: 319 W. 100 S., Vernal, UT 84078, Mr. Clark A. Allred, Attorney at
Law, at 121 W. Main Street, Vernal, UT 84078, and to Mr. G. Mark Thomas, Deputy Uintah
County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078.
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CLARK B ALLRED - 005 5
DONNA M. TROTTER - 8 08 4
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER,
Attorneys for Defendant, Uintah County
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (435) 789-4908
MARK THOMAS
Deputy Uintah County Attorney
152 E 100 N
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (435) 781-4356
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ENTRY
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775
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RANDY
NILE CHAPMAN, ROGER CHAPMAN
and GORDON KARMSTON, TRUSTEE
OF THE EUGENE HARMSTON TRUST,
Plaintiffs,

20010066SS
PAGE
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SIMMONS

RECORDER> UINTAH COUNTY* UTAH
MCKEACHNIE ALLRED HCCLELLAN & TR0TT
121 WEST HAIN
REG B Y : SYLENE ACCUTT0R00P , DEPUTY

ORDER AND
JUDGMENT

vs
C i v i l No. 9 9 0 8 0 0 2 5 5
• J u d ^ e : A. L y n n P a y n e

UINTAH COUNTY,
Defendant

The above captioned matter came before the Court for a jury
trial on September

4 and 5, 2001. The parties having presented

their evidence and argued the matter to the jury and the jury
having been instructed and having entered its verdict finding that
the road was a public road and had been from 1960 through 1998 and
based en that verdict, the Court orders- as follows:

ENTRY 2001006688
BOOK 775
P A G E

1.

The road identified as the North Wyasket Bottom Road as

it crosses the real properties owned by the Plaintiffs in Section
33, Township 7 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Meridian and Section
4, Township 8 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Meridian is a public
road pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §72-5-104.
2.

The Plaintiffs are enjoined from interfering with the

public's use of the road as it crosses their real property.
3.
the

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the width of

road where

it crosses the

Plaintiffs' properties

shall

be

twelve feet and shall follow its historic course except as set
forth on the attached map.
DATED this

i5

day of September, 2001.

A. Lynn Payne
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM
James A. Beckwith
Attorney for Plaintiffs

t:\Uintah County-Chapman\order and judgment
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